The Future of Technology, the Technology of the Future

UK researchers have developed a tiny turbine composed of nested carbon nanotubes. Even though the design is currently only theoretical, many uses having already been suggested for the nanoscale rotor, including in a novel kind of computer memory. The researchers have also suggested that the turbine could be used in a sort of “inkjet” printer for nanofabrication.

But there are possibilities beyond spraying nanoparticles on a surface. If arms were attached to two counter-rotating turbines, then they could be used to forcefully bring molecular components together—mechanosynthesis. It’s probably not possible to make diamondoid structures this way, but there are plenty of other things you could make. After all, we know that this is possible on some level because it’s very similar to how cells form the high energy bond in ATP.

Recently, there was a call for a global treaty, modeled after the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to regulate human genetic engineering. The reference to nuclear weapons immediately called to mind the current global situation, with “rogue” states defying international calls to halt their nuclear development programs. It’s easy to envision a future with a recalcitrant state carrying out a program of human genetic engineering in violation of the so-called Genetic Heritage Safeguard Treaty. Certainly top Pentagon scientists have raised this issue. But is a 20th century solution really the best way to solve a distinctly 21st century problem?

Without dueling superpowers to keep the smaller nations in line, non-proliferation has already started to breakdown. That goes to show that a 20th century solution can’t solve a distinctly 20th century problem in the 21st century. In addition, the technology for human genetic engineering, once developed, will be far easier to conceal from inspectors and satellite reconnaissance than the equipment required to produce nuclear weapons. Thus, enforcement will be much more difficult, even with ostensibly cooperative nations. Enforcement also relies on powerful nation-states, which may be another relic of the 20th century thanks to emerging neofeudalism.

We do need global regulation of human genetic engineering, but it’s vitally important that we not reject world-changing innovations just because they’re new or scary. Genetic engineering isn’t Frankenstein. We need to look at the situation, as much as we can, in terms of what someone in the year 2100 would want us to do and not just have a knee-jerk, 20th century reaction.

This is part four in a five-part series called "The Limits of Accelerating Returns" that focuses on the limitations of Ray Kurzweil's Law of Accelerating Returns when applied to molecular biology and biomedical technology, including longevity treatments. The other articles in the series are "The Limits of Accelerating Returns," "Biology is not Digital," "Garbage In, Garbage Out," and "Implications of Fixed Returns."

In the previous post in this series, I suggested that, in 40 years, we will be able to run complex molecular simulations of the entire human body if the limiting factor is computational power. Unfortunately, that’s just not the case. We can’t generate the requisite data fast enough for the computers to crunch it. Not everything is amenable to accelerating returns.

Read the rest of this entry »

This is part three in a five-part series called "The Limits of Accelerating Returns" that focuses on the limitations of Ray Kurzweil's Law of Accelerating Returns when applied to molecular biology and biomedical technology, including longevity treatments. The other articles in the series are "The Limits of Accelerating Returns," "Biology is not Digital," "Some Rates are Fixed," and "Implications of Fixed Returns."

In his essay called “Making the World a Billion Times Better,” Ray Kurzweil writes, “The approximately 23,000 genes in our cells are basically software programs, and we are making exponential gains in modeling and simulating the information processes that cracking the genome code has unlocked.” The problem is that genes are only roughly analogous to software programs, as I discussed in the previous post in this series, and simulating the information processes of the genome is non-trivial in the extreme.

Let’s take a very simple example of an artificial genome called a “repressilator” that was added to bacteria as a proof-of-concept of synthetic biology and biological simulation. The repressilator’s machinery consists of three genes, each of which turns off one of the other genes. When one of the genes is active, it turns off one of the other genes. Meanwhile, the third gene is in the processing of shutting down the first. When the first gene is turned off, the second one turns on, and stats shutting down the third gene. Thus, there’s a cycle or oscillation to the activation of the genes (the name of the construct is a contraction of “repression” and “oscillation”).

The system also includes a fourth gene that produces a visible signal so that the oscillation can be tracked. This seems like a pretty straightforward system. The scientists who developed it even did a lot of modeling to figure out how to optimize the oscillations before they went to the trouble of building the thing.

But it didn’t work the way they expected.

Read the rest of this entry »

Researchers at Cornell Medical Center in New York have genetically modified a human embryo (additional coverage from The New York Times). While the embryo was not viable due to a chromosomal imbalance, the work has drawn fire from watchdog groups concerned about “designer babies.” I found a quote from Kathy Hudson, director of the Genetics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., particularly interesting:

“We’re not even close to having that technology in hand to be able to do it right,” she said, and it would be ethically unacceptable to try it when it’s unsafe.

That’s a bit of a myopic statement. She seems to be saying that we’ll never develop the techniques because it’s unethical to use them if they’re unsafe, but they can’t be made safe without testing them. The very existence of the story, however, shows that at least one ethics committee in this country approved of using unproven techniques on non-viable embryos. That’s one avenue to perfecting the necessary tools, and there may be others.

Read the rest of this entry »

One day, artificial photosynthesis could provide ultra efficient conversion of the sun’s energy into electricity while simultaneously scrubbing carbon dioxide and perhaps other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. The idea of green—perhaps literally—solar energy collectors on the tops of buildings and cars reminded me of Karl Schroeder’s notes on the invisibility of advanced civilizations. His basic idea is that an advanced society will integrate itself into its environment rather than construct huge technological marvels that stick out like a sore thumb. While it’s difficult to envision how we might offload literal computation—like balancing the checkbook or playing World of Warcraft—into the environment, it certainly appears that artificial photosynthesis and other radical green technologies are the first steps down that road.

A transformation into a zero-footprint society has implications beyond sustainability. Schroeder’s notes are an answer to the Fermi paradox, which asks, “If extraterrestrial intelligence is common, where is everyone?” The answer in this case is that we can’t detect them because they’re essentially invisible thanks to their integration into their environment. As we integrate ourselves into our environment, we too become invisible to outsiders. This is non-trivial.

There is an active and not always amicable debate in SETI circles over whether we should limit ourselves in merely listening for signals from extraterrestrial intelligences (known as “passive SETI”) or attempt to contact them ourselves (referred to as “active SETI”) (additional coverage by David Brin and Daily Galaxy). The contention is the non-zero possibility that active SETI might alert a malevolent entity to our presence, thereby dooming humanity. But if we manage to make ourselves invisible between now and when our signal reaches our would-be foe, they may decide that there’s nothing interesting on our little blue speck after all. Thus, our quest for sustainable technologies might, one day, save us from an alien invasion.